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Abstract 
   Public news can be expected to change market prices but, unlike “public information,” 
there are differing expectations about the full impact and hence trading is necessary for the 
market to process these divergent views.  A good illustration of this is a surprise 
announcement of an increase in German interest rates coupled with remarkably detailed 
concurrent transactions data from an electronic market.  After initial trades hollowed out 
the market, a large volume of seller-initiated trades removed most of the existing demand, 
without many of the prior bids being withdrawn.  While this is contrary to a rational-
expectations view of public information, it is consistent with dealers’ practice, as an 
exercise in self-discipline, to book targeted profits if possible in the face of uncertainty.  
Evidence also shows that the speculative activity by traders in reaction to the news 
destabilized the market for the next two hours. 
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1. Public news and a notable price change 
On Wednesday, October 8, 1997, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, testified before the House Budget Committee.  He said labor trends suggest that 
the U.S. economy is on an unsustainable track … continued rapid stock market gains are 
unrealistic, that inflation is likely to rise unless demand slows markedly and that 
productivity gains are unlikely to be enough to curb price pressures.  These remarks 
suggested that the Fed might take a more active role in trying to temper stock market gains, 
possibly through higher U.S. interest rates, with a potential appreciation of the dollar. 
The next day, Thursday, October 9, the Bundesbank had a council meeting to 
review its policy positions.  Based on the fact that German unemployment remained at a 
high level of 11.2% in September and there was no major inflation threat at the time, the 
market consensus was for no immediate interest rate hike.  Various presses repeatedly 
reported that the majority of traders expected no changes in interest rates that day, thinking 
it more likely to occur in a few weeks. 
These expectations about the timing proved wrong.  An 11:50 Greenwich Mean 
Time (GMT) AP-Dow Jones News reported: “At 1130 GMT, the Bundesbank announced 
that it had fixed the rate for its securities repurchase agreements at 3.30% for the next two 
weeks, up from 3.00%.  The German central bank said that the move had been aimed at 
preempting higher inflation, and will help damp growth in the M3 money supply 
aggregate.  The dollar fell sharply following the Bundesbank announcement, hitting an 
intraday low of DM1.7428 just three minutes later, but by 1140 GMT had bounced to 
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DM1.7450.”  This Bundesbank rate hike initiated an end to the five-year decline in 
European rates.1 
For this particular Bundesbank interest-rate announcement, traders were not only 
surprised by the decision of an interest rate hike, but also by the unusual release time of 
11:30 GMT.  Hardy (1998) documents that the Bundesbank Council reviews its interest 
rates every other Thursday and decisions are announced later that afternoon or early the 
next morning.  The press center of the Bundesbank confirms this claim and says that the 
most frequent timing for announcements is 3:00 in the afternoon (which would be 14:00 
GMT).  When the Bundesbank made its interest rate announcement on Oct. 9th 1997, the 
array of open orders appeared to be fairly normal.  Thus, the unusual timing of unexpected 
news provides an opportunity to study precisely how traders react to a surprise 
announcement. 
As is well known, in principle a price response to new public information can take 
place without any trades.  According to Fleming and Remolona (1999, p. 1901), “Theory 
(e.g., French and Roll (1986)) identifies public information as that which affects prices 
before anyone can trade on it.”  In a foreign exchange market, this might happen when 
dealer quotes are only indicative and actual deals are struck over the telephone.  If all 
dealers agree on a new market value after a public announcement, all prior quotes become 
obsolete.  New quotes appear and trading can continue as usual around a markedly 
changed market price, without order flow during the change.  This concept constitutes a 
standard simplification in the analysis of market microstructure that public information 
                                                          
1 The English version of the press release is reproduced in an appendix along with a description of how the 
Bundesbank conveys its news to the public.      
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does not affect the impact of concurrent order flows (see Hasbrouck (1991) as an 
example).  Andersen, et al. (2003, p. 59) write that it will be of interest “to determine 
whether news affects exchange rates via order flow or instantaneously.”   
We will use the term public news for a situation in which there is uncertainty about 
the market impact of new information made available to all market participants at the same 
time.  While we believe that the full impact of unexpected news will rarely be immediately 
assessed in the same way by all market participants, this terminology will avoid any 
potential confusion with the French and Roll concept of public information.  When there is 
uncertainty about how much market price will change as the result of news, there will also 
be differing expectations.  Trading then enables the market to sort out the net effect of the 
news.   
 The idea of divergent mappings from information to prices is discussed by Lyons 
(2001, p. 21) as one reason why order flow conveys information to the market and 
therefore tends to move price.  He also quotes Isard (1995, pp. 182-3) who states that in 
view of “economist’s very limited information about the relationship between equilibrium 
exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals, … it is hardly conceivable that rational 
market participants with complete information about macroeconomic fundamentals could 
use that information to form precise expectations about the future market-clearing level of 
exchange rates.”  Isard’s words aptly describe the situation that applies when we refer to an 
announcement of a change in fundamentals as public news. 
In an electronic market, quotes are firm.  If bids or offers are not canceled prior to 
or during a public announcement, transactions can occur as the price adjusts in reaction to 
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new information.  In the case of the surprise announcement by the Bundesbank on October 
9, 1997, a huge volume of trading did occur in the minute of the announcement.  
A notable change in behavior occurred at about 11:30:35, or 35 seconds after the 
announcement reportedly began.  The transaction price of the dollar actually rose 
somewhat during the first 35 seconds and reached 1.7560 DM.  Shortly after 11:30:35, 
however, the price of the dollar started to drop.  At 11:30:59.03, there is a trade at 1.7450 
DM.  That is a drop of over 0.6 percent in 25 seconds. [ln(1.756) – ln(1.745) = 0.006284.]  
To place the drop in perspective, consider what Dominguez (2003) found when she 
examined 5-minute returns in the DM/$ rate from 1989 to 1995.  A return of 0.006284 
would have been the ninth largest in that six-year period. 
In this paper, we provide a detailed examination of data from an electronic market 
to study market reactions to this public news.  Fig. 1 shows transactions prices for the 
DM/$ on the day of the announcement.  The dashed line represents cumulative order flow.  
In the absence of public news, order flow, to be discussed in more detail below, generally 
drives prices in interdealer markets, such as the one depicted here.  An upward move in 
price is associated with more buyer than seller initiated trades and a downward move with 
the opposite.  Evans and Lyons (2002) have shown the strong short-term impact of order 
flow on exchange rates.  In the case of the Bundesbank announcement, order flow turns out 
to play an extremely important role. 
There is a literature examining the link between the arrival of news and market 
activity, measured by trading volume and price volatility.  Berry and Howe (1994) and 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) are such studies with a focus on a stock market, while 
Melvin and Yin (2000) deal with a foreign exchange market.  We complement this 
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literature by an analysis of market activity in an electronic foreign exchange market as the 
result of a speculative activity by traders in response to a surprise macro announcement.  
In what follows, section 2 describes some remarkably detailed data and the nature 
of an electronic interdealer market.  There are two distinct phases of trading activity in the 
first minute after 11:30.  The first phase, lasting about 35 seconds and described in section 
3, is a flurry of trades and a hollowing out of the market, a strong indication of uncertainty 
about the pending announcement. 
The second phase, discussed in section 4, is a large drop in the dollar as sellers 
rapidly hit existing demand.  What is surprising here is how little of the demand was 
withdrawn during this period.   
The speculative trading that took place during that first minute set in motion 
subsequent dynamics, which are discussed in Section 5.  In the second minute after the 
announcement, something occurs that is quite contrary to the idea that price adjusts 
without trades or order flow when there is new public information.  In this case, order flow 
was strongly negative throughout the second minute and yet price changed very little.  We 
offer an explanation that is consistent with the uncertainties generated by public news and 
the prior speculative trading.  Section 5 also reports evidence that it took about two hours 
before the market again settled into more normal patterns.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. An electronic interdealer FX market 
The interdealer market data we will analyze come from what is known as the 
D2000-2 electronic market, maintained by Reuters.  The data for the week of October 6 – 
10, 1997, for trading of the DM/$ were obtained from Reuters by the Financial Markets 
 7
Group at the London School of Economics.  See Goodhart, et al. (1996), and Danielsson 
and Payne (2002) for additional details about the D2000-2 data. 
At any time, a participating dealer can enter:  
A bid, a limit order to buy at a specified price or lower,  
An ask, a limit order to sell at a specified price or higher,  
A hit, a market sell order at the best available bid price, or  
A take, a market buy order at the best available ask price.   
The dealer can also withdraw or cancel an unfilled bid or ask.  The system records actual 
transactions and keeps track of all the existing orders that have not been filled.  The screen 
that the dealers see shows only the highest bid, the lowest ask, the quantities available at 
these best bid and ask prices, and the price of the most recent transaction.  The data show 
to the nearest 0.01 of a second the times when a transaction enters the market and when it 
is removed or withdrawn. 
An interdealer FX market provides a link between diverse buyers and sellers of 
foreign exchange.   For ease in exposition we will often refer to a bank’s dealing room as 
the bank and, while several people may be involved, we will occasionally refer to a single 
trader carrying out different transactions and representing the fiduciary interests of the 
bank.  See Lyons (2001) for a detailed discussion of the microstructure approach to 
exchange rates. 
Portfolio shifts and changing needs for different currencies by banks’ customers are 
an ongoing process.  Customers may deal regularly with one bank or may check with 
several banks for the best prices before placing an order.  A bank will typically quote both 
bid and ask prices in response to a query and the caller may or may not choose to buy 
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foreign currency at the bank’s ask price or sell at the bank’s bid price.  These quotes will 
change over time in response to market changes and may be different for different types of 
customers.  There are now electronic broking systems for these customer markets that did 
not exist in 1997. 
For illustrative purposes, suppose the bank offers to sell dollars at 1.7520 DM/$ 
and to buy at 1.7510 DM/$.  Consider what might happen if a customer decides to buy 2 
million dollars with DM at a price of 1.7520.  This is an example of what is known as 
private information in the literature.  In this case, the bank is now long in DM and short in 
dollars and needs to decide what to do.  A trader for the bank can put in a market take 
order in the interdealer market to buy dollars right away.  Or the trader can speculate by 
putting in a limit bid order to buy dollars at a price below the current best offer price in the 
market. 
A decision to cover the bank’s position and buy dollars immediately in the 
interdealer market is profitable for the bank because the “touch” or “inside spread”, the 
difference between the lowest offer price and the highest bid price, is typically smaller than 
the spread in the customer market.  Suppose, for example, that the best offer price is 
1.7516 and the best bid price is 1.7514.  If the bank buys 2 million dollars at 1.7516, there 
is an immediate profit of 800 DM ($2,000,000 times 0.0004 DM/$). 
As evident in Fig. 1, the market price jumps around.  If instead of immediately 
covering the bank’s short position in dollars, the bank’s trader puts in a bid price to buy 2 
million dollars at a price below 1.7516, say 1.7514, and waits for another dealer to agree to 
sell 2 million at the limit price, this is a speculative position.  The market may hit the price 
and the profit is 1,200 DM.  However, there may be a subsequent run of buyer-initiated 
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trades, and the trading prices may start to rise.  In setting a limit order, the trader has to 
weigh the tradeoff between the expected gain from waiting and the greater uncertainty 
about the eventual price at which the bank’s position is covered. 2    
Our example of a bank receiving an order from a customer to purchase 2 million 
dollars is, as noted above, private information.  If the bank immediately covers the position 
in the interdealer market by making a purchase of dollars, this is known as a positive order 
flow and in effect transmits to the market the bank’s private information.  An order flow is 
a signed transaction in the interdealer market.  If a buyer initiates a trade, the order flow is 
positive.  If a seller initiates a trade, the order flow is negative.  Over a period of time, the 
net order flow is the difference between the quantity of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated 
trades in the interdealer market. 
Since all transactions in this interdealer market are in millions of dollars, in later 
discussion we will refer to the transactions in units, where it is understood that one unit is 
one million dollars. 
 
3. The market while the announcement is pending 
At any time in the interdealer market, there is an array of limit orders to buy and an 
array of limit orders to sell.  We will refer to unfilled buy orders as demand in the 
interdealer market and to unfilled sell orders as supply.  Fig. 2 depicts the situation at 
11:30 am on Thursday, October 9, 1997.  At precisely 11:30 am the highest buy order was 
at 1.7530 DM for 5 units.  The relatively flat demand schedule depicted in Fig. 2 is the 
                                                          
2 Costs and benefits of placing orders rather than dealing immediately are discussed in Handa and Schwartz 
(1996), Foucault (1999), and Hollifield et al. (2002), inter alia. 
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cumulative array of limit buy orders unfilled as of 11:30.  These consist of the 5 units at 
1.7530, 1 unit at 1.7523, 2 units at 1.7522, 2 units at 1.7521, and on down.  The supply 
schedule is the cumulative array of limit sell orders: 5 units at 1.7535, 1 unit at 1.7538, 2 
units at 1.7539, 3 units at 1.7542 and on up.  The degree of liquidity in the market is 
reflected in both the inside spread and the flatness of the curves.  For the picture shown, 
the inside spread is 0.0005, and the spread at 10 units is 0.0021 (=1.7542-1.7521).  These 
spreads were somewhat more than was typical for this market during active hours, but not 
unusually so. (See Danielsson and Payne (2002) for a distribution of inside spreads during 
the week and footnote 4 below.)  The picture is one of fairly strong buying support for the 
dollar at this time. 
When the announcement by the Bundesbank reportedly began at 11:30, there are no 
trades for the next 13 seconds and 6 units of sell offers are withdrawn.  The absence of 
trades suggests that dealers temporarily stopped trading to note that an announcement was 
pending. 
Over the next 22 seconds, from 11:30:13 to 11:30:35, there is a large volume of 
activity.  About 87 units are traded.  These are both supply initiated and demand initiated, 
and the price trend is generally up during these 22 seconds, rising from 1.7530 to 1.7560.  
The fact that the transactions prices rose indicates that many traders did not yet expect that 
the news would precipitate a fall in the dollar. 
Fig. 2 shows considerably more demand than supply at 11:30:00.  We interpret this 
as indicative of a greater volume of open short positions in dollars than open long positions 
in the interdealer market.  The increase in the price of the dollar during those 35 seconds 
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undoubtedly represents more short covering by buyer-initiated trades at the best offer 
prices than long covering by seller-initiated trades at the best bid prices during this period. 
As a result of this activity, there is a substantial hollowing out of the market from 
11:30:00 to 11:30:35.  This can be seen by comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.  By 11:30:35, the 
inside spread grew to 0.0039 and the spread at 10 units to 0.0052.  These are very large for 
this market.  Some dealers evidently covered speculative positions and were waiting to see 
how to interpret the news. 
 
4. A dramatic shift in trading activity 
The full impact of the announcement hits the market at about 11:30:35.  As seen by 
comparing Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, there is a dramatic shrinkage of the demand curve between 
11:30:35 and 11:31:00.  Beginning at 11:30:37 until 11:30:59, sellers rapidly hit buy orders 
along the demand curve, mostly by crossed limit orders rather than by market orders.3  
During that time, the price falls to 1.7450.  86 units along the demand curve that existed at 
11:30:35 are removed.  Remarkably, only 5 of these units were removed by bidders 
withdrawing their bids.  All the rest were seller-initiated trades. 
During these 25 seconds, there is also considerable activity by sellers testing the 
market.  If an offer does not immediately result in a transaction, many of these offers are 
withdrawn within a few seconds.  A comparison of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 shows a few new 
                                                          
3 A market sell order trades at the best available bid price.  In a rapidly changing market, there is uncertainty 
about what the transaction price may be.  A limit order to sell below existing bid prices will transact at any 
bid prices above the limit order, up to the quantity specified, but assures that the selling price will not be 
below the limit price. 
 12
offers that entered between 11:30:35 and 11:31 are still on the supply side of the market.  
All of the unfilled offers as of 11:30:35 are eventually withdrawn without any sale. 
In this electronic market, because buy orders were not withdrawn quickly, negative 
order flow drove the price lower.  By 11:30:35, many dealers, contrary to prior 
expectations, expected the DM price of the dollar to fall.  If that had been fully anticipated, 
there would not have been such a high and flat demand curve at that time. 
An interesting question is why more of the demand was not immediately 
withdrawn after 11:30:35.  To address this question, we need to distinguish limit orders by 
whether or not they represent speculative cover for open positions.  Some dealers may, at 
that moment, be market makers without a long or short position.  Their limit orders have 
been entered in hopes of making profits by eventual transactions on both sides of their 
spread.  When new information arrives suggesting that the market price will fall, their bids 
should be immediately withdrawn and new bids entered at a lower price, although these 
dealers may wait to see where the market stabilizes before entering new bids.  There is less 
urgency about immediately replacing their ask prices in this situation.  The fact that so few 
units of demand were withdrawn as the price fell suggests that there were very few market 
makers without open positions among the higher bid prices at 11:30:35. 
From this we infer that most of the bids at the top of the demand curve were put in 
by dealers with short positions in dollars.  Their bid prices, if executed, would yield a 
profit to the bank.  The question then is why these dealers did not withdraw their bids, 
which were based on prior information, and put in new lower ones to reap extra expected 
profits.  Since these bids represent speculative cover of open positions that are the result of 
prior sales of dollars, the fall in the price of the dollar is good news for these traders whose 
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bids can shortly be executed if not withdrawn.  If they get greedy, withdraw their existing 
bids, and try to buy later at a lower price, they may miss a turning point and not realize the 
profit at all.  As an exercise in self-discipline, which is essential for success, dealers let 
targeted profitable bids be hit.  Conversations with dealers indicate that this is a common 
practice, and in a practitioner’s guide for currency traders, Henderson (2002, p. 189) 
stresses: “Trading discipline is at least as important as having the right view.” 
For reasons of confidentiality, individual dealers are not identified in the data set, 
so we cannot tell if dealers whose prior bids were hit also tried to make sales to other 
bidders.  There is no reason why they cannot join the crowd and make speculative sales if 
they think additional expected profits are possible.  
These considerations raise another point.  While order flow drives the market price 
given the existing limit orders, the source of the order flow can make a difference.  Dealer-
driven order flow can have implications for subsequent market behavior that differ from 
customer-driven order flow.  When a seller-initiated transaction in the interdealer market 
covers a bank’s prior sale to a customer, the bank’s position has been squared and there is 
no subsequent potential trading because of that transaction. By dealer-driven order flow, 
we mean speculative open positions taken by dealers.  At some point those dealers will 
need to cover their positions and that can induce further uncertainty and volatility in the 
market.  Thus, we expect subsequent effects well after the Bundesbank announcement.   
 
5. Time to settle down 
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To begin an examination of the subsequent dynamics, we take a closer look at the 
patterns of order flow and price changes during the two minutes after 11:30.  Fig. 5 shows 
cumulative order flow and transaction prices from 11:30 to 11:32.4   
As can be seen in Fig. 5, the pattern during the first minute is definitely one of 
order flow driving price.  The relatively big drop in price right after 11:30:35 was a bounce 
from a prior buyer-initiated trade along the existing supply schedule to a seller-initiated 
trade along the then much lower demand schedule. 
At first glance, the second minute looks anomalous.  Order flow continued to be 
strongly negative but this did not drive price lower.  There were trades at a price of 1.7450 
DM/$ at 11:31:01.06 and again a minute later at 11:32:01.60.  In between, price bounced 
up occasionally but never very far above 1.7450.  The negative flow is generated by the 
fact that dealers were putting in new buy orders that were almost immediately hit by seller-
initiated trades.  It is likely that these new buy orders were by dealers who had made 
speculative sales during the price decline in the first minute.  It looked as if a temporary 
floor had been found, so they were booking their profit from the prior speculative sales. 
The fact that there were also willing sellers at this price level reflects still divergent 
views about when the price will stop falling.  The evidence suggests the following 
scenario.  Some customers, who continuously monitor the market, decide to sell dollars.  
This will give rise to customer-driven order flow in the interdealer market.  The banks 
receiving these orders have private information about selling pressure that they believe will 
drive price still lower in the interdealer market.  The dealers in these banks therefore want 
                                                          
4 This differs from Fig. 1 in two ways.  First, Fig. 5 shows tick-by-tick data while Fig. 1 is accumulated over 
5 second intervals and the price is the last transaction price during the interval. Second, in Fig. 5 order flow is 
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to cover their long positions immediately by selling dollars in the interdealer market.  
Some may also take speculative short positions.  Thus, the decline in price in the first 
minute could have been in anticipation of customer-driven order flow that would follow in 
the second minute or later.  For price to decline further then depends on ensuing decisions 
by customers to sell dollars. 
 For the next two hours, with lots of bounces, the trend in price is down and order 
flow is negative.  Over time, as dealers try to square their positions, their purely 
speculative order flows should tend to cancel each other.  Therefore, a negative net order 
flow over a period as long as two hours is very likely generated by outside customer sell 
orders.  In that case, the picture in Fig. 1 indicates that somewhat delayed portfolio shifts 
out of dollars and into DMs drove the price of the dollar down. 
This downward pressure on the dollar then drew central banks into the market.  
According to an AFX news wire at 14:03 GMT: “A number of European central banks, 
among them the Bundesbank, are reported by dealers to have been intervening in the 
currency market in an effort to cap the strength of the mark following the decisions to raise 
German and other core European interest rates, dealers said.  They said that central banks 
have been buying dollar/mark just below the 1.7400 level.” 
In Fig. 1, the downward trend in the price of the dollar is reversed by about 13:30.  
In addition to central bank demands for dollars, outside sellers of dollars are probably 
buying them back.  By the end of the day, the dollar has recovered to its level reached 
shortly after the announcement. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
weighted by the size of a transaction, and in Fig. 1 order flow is unweighted. 
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Evidence indicates that it took about two hours for trading volume and price 
volatility to settle down to normal in this market.  Table 1 records mean trading volumes 
per minute in 10 minute intervals from 11:00 to 14:00 on Thursday and on Monday, 
Tuesday and Wednesday, as well as p-values for the hypotheses of equal means.  Between 
11:10 and 11:30 on Thursday, volume was slightly less than on the prior three days but not 
significantly so.  As we detailed above, volume rose dramatically during and immediately 
after the announcement on Thursday, and significantly so compared with Monday through 
Wednesday.  Volume remained relatively high on Thursday until about 13:20.  
For eight different hours of the day, Monday through Thursday from 7:30 to 15:30 
GMT, for a total of 1920 minutes, average trading volume was 19.7 million dollars per 
minute with a standard deviation of 17.7.  The high standard deviation relative to the mean 
reflects a few large outliers and a strong positive skewness of 2.5.  In those 1920 minutes, 
over half of the minutes with the largest 1 percent of total volume occurred on Thursday 
within two hours after the announcement.  
A similar story about the continuing effects of the surprise announcement can be 
seen in data on price volatility, shown in Table 2.  Price volatility is measured by the 
average absolute values of the log change in end-of-minute prices.  Thursday’s volatility 
jumps to exceed an average level of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday substantially for the 
30 minutes following the announcement and remains relatively high until at least 13:40.  
Of the 19 highest absolute values of log price changes on those four days, 14 or them 
occurred within two hours after the announcement on Thursday and 11 of them within the 
first half hour.  The story is much the same in terms of within minute price volatility.  
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One other way of assessing market reactions to the news is to examine the spreads 
between the supply and demand curves, such as those depicted in Fig. 2 through Fig. 4.  
Table 3 shows the inside spread and spreads at 10 and 40 units at various times on 
Thursday.  While the inside spread remains fairly narrow after 11:40, there is an occasional 
widening at higher numbers of units.  By 13:10 a fairly normal depth to the market appears 
to have been reestablished, although the spreads are still somewhat higher than for 
comparable times on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. 5  A figure for demand and supply 
curves at 13:20, is very much like the one at 11:30 shown by Fig. 2, albeit at lower prices. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
An announcement of an interest-rate increase by the Bundesbank beginning at 
11:30 Thursday, October 9, 1997, is a good example of public news, in which uncertainty 
about the impact results in substantial trading.  It contains news that had evidently not been 
anticipated at that time and therefore, together with a concurrent record of transactions in 
an electronic DM/$ market, provides an opportunity to analyze in detail dynamic market 
responses to news.  Portfolio balance models predict that this should cause an immediate 
appreciation of the DM, as portfolio managers try to switch from dollar to DM assets, but 
no one knows for sure how much appreciation will occur. 
The first to react to such public news will be the traders in the interdealer market.  
If existing price quotes are all indicative and if there is a consensus on what the new price 
                                                          
5 For example, a sampling of spreads between 13:00 and 14:00 on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday yields 
are average inside spread of 2.0, an average spread at 10 units of 7.4 and an average spread at 40 units of 
41.4. 
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should be, then the DM/$ price can in principle drop immediately without any trading (the 
French and Roll (1986) view of public information) . 
By contrast, in the case of the Bundesbank’s interest-rate announcement, the initial 
reaction is an extremely high volume of trading, both supply and demand initiated, and an 
increasing spread as some traders presumably cover speculative positions.  After 11:30:35, 
there begins a huge volume of seller initiated trades (negative order flow) along much of 
the existing demand schedule. 
When most market participants believe that the price of the dollar is about to drop, 
there is obviously no immediate need to cancel high sell orders.  However, dealers who are 
long in dollars will have an urgency to sell quickly or risk losses on their positions.  Hence 
they rush in to sell at existing bid prices. 
The news that the dollar will drop is good news for dealers who are short in dollars 
and have open bids to buy dollars.  Their choice is either (1) to withdraw their bids and 
wait until the price does drop or (2) to let the market hit their bids, book their profits, and 
perhaps speculate with sell orders of their own.  The fact in this instance that very few bids 
were withdrawn indicates that dealers with short positions in dollars overwhelmingly chose 
the second option.  This is consistent with a practice by dealers, as an exercise in self 
discipline, to book profits targeted by the original bids in the face of continuing uncertainty 
about price changes. 
These considerations lead us to hypothesize that, in a reverse situation in which 
public news suddenly calls for the appreciation of the currency being traded, offers in an 
electronic market will be taken more quickly by eager buyers than existing sell orders will 
be withdrawn. 
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We also attribute the continued high volume and price volatility of the DM/$ after 
11:31 on Thursday, October 9, 1997, to the speculative activity just prior to 11:31.  Except 
for those who were covering long positions in the dollar, dealers who sold as the price was 
dropping now have short positions.  They represent a base of support as dealers try to 
decide when to square their positions.  As dealers adjust positions, waves of trades and 
price bounces can readily follow. 
From evidence in the D2000-2 data, it took about two hours after the 
announcement before the market settled down from the dealer generated speculative 
activity.  Some of the extra volume after 11:31 can be the result of outside desired portfolio 
shifts and central bank interventions, but the extra price volatility is very likely generated 
by dealer speculation. 
One last point to emphasize is that in a real-time electronic market, everyone does 
not react at once to news.  First movers can influence the subsequent dynamics.  In the case 
of the German interest rate announcement in October 1997, speculative selling hit existing 
demand in the interdealer market faster than demand was withdrawn and well before 
outside portfolio shifts could be implemented. 
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Appendix: The Bundesbank press release of Oct. 9th, 1997 
The Bundesbank holds a press conference and gives out press-releases in both 
German and English versions after each meeting of the Central Bank Council.  The 
Bundesbank does not broadcast its announcement but radio, TV, and news-wire reporters 
are invited to attend the press conference.  News agencies would immediately convey the 
official announcement to their stations and the news is then transmitted to the dealing 
room.  The English version of the press release reads as follows: 
“At its meeting today, the Central Bank Council of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
decided to raise the fixed rate of interest for its securities repurchase agreements (repos) on 
October 15 and 22, 1997 from hitherto 3.00% to 3.30%.  
“The Central Bank Council gave the following explanation for the move:  
“The Bundesbank has been pursuing an expansionary monetary policy for a 
considerable time now.  On balance, the central bank interest rates have been at historically 
low levels since the interest rate cuts in April and August 1996.  Money balances grew 
sharply in 1996 and at the beginning of 1997.  Owing to the weakening of the external 
value of the Deutsche Mark so far this year, monetary conditions have eased further. 
“A concurrent shift has occurred in the monetary policy setting.  The price climate 
changed during the summer months.  Import prices, producer prices and consumer prices 
have all risen.  This was due in large part to exchange rate movements against the US 
dollar and to increases in administered prices. 
“To date, falling unit labour costs have acted as counterweight to “imported” and 
administered price stimuli.  Hence there is no cause to dramatise the current price trend.  
The risks to price stability have increased, however.  Timely countermeasures improve the 
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prospects of steadying the growth process and prevent the build-up of an inflation potential 
in the run-up to European monetary union. 
“In keeping with its statutory mandate and within the framework of its monetary 
policy options, the Bundesbank must endevour to ensure, above all, that the provision of 
liquidity to the economy offers no leeway for an acceleration in the upward trust of prices.  
In order to safeguard this for the future, a further deceleration of monetary growth is called 
for – as the Central Bank Council pointed out already in July in its review of the monetary 
target.  This slight tightening of monetary policy associated with the raising of the repo 
rate is intended to serve that purpose.”    
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Table 1 
Average per-minute trading volumes: Thursday vs. Monday, Tuesday and Wednesdaya 
Interval 11:00-11:10 
 
11:10-11:20 11:20-11:30 11:30-11:40 11:40-11:50 11:50-12:00
Thur. 19.750 13.250 12.050 82.350 67.300 40.300 
Mon.-Wed. 17.167 15.667 18.267 16.750 17.933 15.967 
Difference 2.583 -2.417 -6.217 65.600*** 49.367*** 24.333*** 
[p-value] [0.685] [0.458] [0.115] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Interval 12:00-12:10 
 
12:10-12:20 12:20-12:30 12:30-12:40 12:40-12:50 12:50-13:00
Thur. 24.750 38.350 48.400 35.200 28.150 17.500 
Mon.-Wed. 11.550 16.967 34.433 18.050 27.967 21.733 
Difference 13.200*** 21.383** 13.967* 17.150** 0.183 -4.233 
[p-value] [0.001] [0.013] [0.085] [0.023] [0.971] [0.280] 
Interval 13:00-13:10 
 
13:10-13:20 13:20-13:30 13:30-13:40 13:40-13:50 13:50-14:00
Thur. 44.950 55.100 25.050 21.050 19.700 24.750 
Mon.-Wed. 28.583 28.717 23.367 22.533 22.117 23.700 
Difference 16.367 26.383*** 1.683 -1.483 -2.417 1.050 
[p-value] [0.359] [0.001] [0.623] [0.726] [0.505] [0.840] 
  a Unequal variances are assumed when testing the hypotheses of equal means.  Also, *, **, and *** 
denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively. 
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Table 2 
Last trade price volatility comparisons: Thursday vs. average of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesdaya 
Interval 11:00-11:10 
 
11:10-11:20 11:20-11:30 11:30-11:40 11:40-11:50 11:50-12:00
Thur. 1.264 0.916 1.239 4.650 3.042 2.096 
Mon.-Wed. 0.677 0.470 0.801 0.726 0.643 0.586 
Difference 0.587 0.446** 0.438 3.924* 2.399*** 1.510** 
[p-value] [0.220] [0.026] [0.191] [0.052] [0.004] [0.019] 
Interval 12:00-12:10 
 
12:10-12:20 12:20-12:30 12:30-12:40 12:40-12:50 12:50-13:00
Thur. 0.873 0.897 1.321 0.848 1.471 1.497 
Mon.-Wed. 0.454 0.627 0.636 0.479 0.578 0.429 
Difference 0.419 0.270 0.685 0.369** 0.894*** 1.067** 
[p-value] [0.226] [0.393] [0.065] [0.046] [0.006] [0.048] 
Interval 13:00-13:10 
 
13:10-13:20 13:20-13:30 13:30-13:40 13:40-13:50 13:50-14:00
Thur. 1.573 1.652 1.001 1.227 0.826 0.850 
Mon.-Wed. 1.014 0.569 0.560 0.634 0.552 0.577 
Difference 0.560 1.083** 0.441** 0.592* 0.274 0.274 
[p-value] [0.454] [0.027] [0.020] [0.061] [0.208] [0.293] 
  a Unequal variances are assumed when testing the hypotheses of equal means.  Also, *, **, and *** 











































Inside Spread  3 5 39 15 4 1 3 
Spread at 10 units 18 21 52 62 4 10 40 

















Inside Spread  3 2 1 3 3 1 1 
Spread at 10 units 14 23 10 6 11 9 4 

















Inside Spread  3 3 2 2 2 4 2 
Spread at 10 units 22 6 15 9 11 21 10 
Spread at 40 units 75 25 60 58 55 75 60 
  a Spreads are shown as 1000 times the actual spreads. 
 
